基于改进的电力现货交易下调度研究

Dispatching Research Based on Improved Spot Market

摘要:

电力现货交易可增加系统调峰能力，从而有效减少新能源限电，促进新能源消纳；但现货交易中部分规定会导致参与成员缺少激励措施而降低参与意愿，本文基于“非价格歧视”理论对现货交易中自备电厂负荷、谷时段小工业负荷以及新加入采暖负荷机组现货交易成员进行扩展，然后根据报出清顺序确定优先交易对象；通过对比无现货交易、原现货交易和改进现货交易下新能源限电和现货交易下调度成本，验证了本文提出改进现货交易调度方法的有效性。

Abstract:

Spot market can increase the peak shaving capacity of the system, which can effectively reduce new energy abandonment and promote the consumption of new energy. However, non-price discrimination in spot market can cause participating members to lack incentives and reduce their willingness to participate. In spot market, the self-owned power plant load, small industrial load during the valley period, and the spot market members of newly-added heating load units are expanded, and then the priority transaction object is determined according to the order of clearing. Dispatching costs under new energy curtailment and spot market verify the effectiveness of the proposed improved spot market dispatching method.